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I N T E R N AT I O N A L A R B I T R AT I O N
Does the New York Convention Allow a Non-Party to an Arbitration
Agreement to Use Equitable Estoppel to Compel Arbitration?
CASE AT A GLANCE 
A 1958 treaty, known as the New York Convention, requires countries to give effect to international
arbitration agreements and awards. In this case, the Court must decide whether the Convention allows a
non-party to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration by using the doctrine of equitable estoppel.


GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC
Docket No. 18-1048
Argument Date: January 21, 2020
From: The Eleventh Circuit
by Robert M. Jarvis
Nova Southeastern University College of Law, Fort Lauderdale, FL

INTRODUCTION
In 1958, the United Nations promulgated the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more
commonly known as the New York Convention. See 330 U.N.T.S.
38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 7 I.L.M. 1046. Today, 161 countries are parties to
the Convention, making it one of the most successful commercial
treaties ever produced.
The United States acceded to the Convention in 1970. To
implement it, Chapter 2 was added to Title 9 of the United States
Code. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208.
Prior to the addition of Chapter 2, Title 9 had consisted solely of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The FAA was passed in 1925
to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts[.]” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Today, the FAA, as amended, constitutes
Chapter 1 of Title 9. See 9 U.S.C. Sections 1–16. Chapter 1 applies
to domestic arbitrations.

arbitration agreement is subject to the New York Convention, and
therefore Chapter 2, if four elements are present:
(1) there is an agreement in writing within the
meaning of the Convention; (2) the agreement provides
for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the
Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is
considered commercial; and (4) a party to the agreement
is not an American citizen, or that the commercial
relationship has some reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states.
Id. at 1294 n.7.
In the current case, everyone agrees that elements 2 (arbitration
in a signatory country—here, Germany), 3 (commercial
transaction—here, the sale of machinery), and 4 (at least one
non-U.S. citizen—here, a French company) are present. Where
the sides disagree, and what the Supreme Court must decide, is
whether element 1 (an agreement in writing) is present.

Chapter 2 contains a residual application clause (RAC). See 9
U.S.C. Section 208. It reads as follows: “Chapter 1 applies to
actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent
that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention
as ratified by the United States.”

ISSUE

Thus, when confronted with a case subject to the New York
Convention, a United States court must consider the Convention;
Chapter 2 of Title 9; and, to the extent that it does not cause a
conflict, Chapter 1 of Title 9.

FACTS

As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 545 U.S. 1136 (2005), an

On November 25, 2007, Thyssenkrupp Stainless USA, LLC
(TKS) TKAG’s United States subsidiary, entered into three
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Does the New York Convention allow a non-party to an arbitration
agreement to use the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel
arbitration?

In May 2007, the German conglomerate Thyssenkrupp AG (TKAG)
selected Calvert, Alabama, as the site of its new $4.65 billion carbon
and stainless steel factory. Calvert is a suburb of Mobile, Alabama.
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contracts—designated 1001, 1002, and 1003—with F.L. Industries,
Inc. (FLI), a United States subsidiary of the French conglomerate
Fives SA. Pursuant to the contracts, FLI agreed to supply three cold
rolling mills (CRMs) to the Calvert factory.
“Rolling” refers to the flattening, shaping, and smoothing of metal
by passing it through rollers at high pressure. In cold rolling, the
metal is rolled at room temperature; in hot rolling, the metal is
heated before being rolled. Cold rolling is both more expensive and
more labor intensive than hot rolling, but produces pieces that are
stronger and have a better finish.
The contracts gave FLI the right to subcontract the work but
specified which subcontractors it could use. See Annex A3 of the
contracts. On December 18, 2007, FLI entered into a “consortial
agreement” with Converteam SAS (CT) and DMS SA, two French
companies that were on the list of approved subcontractors. Under
the consortial agreement, CT agreed to provide each of the CRMs
with three motors.
The TKS-FLI contracts required any disputes to be arbitrated in
Düsseldorf, Germany under German law using the arbitration rules
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). See Sections 23.1,
23.2, 23.5 of the contracts. They additionally described TKS as the
“Buyer,” FLI as the “Seller,” and stated: “When Seller is mentioned
it shall be understood as Sub-contractors included, except if
expressly stated otherwise.” See Section 1.2 of the contracts.
The consortial agreement likewise required disputes to be
arbitrated using the ICC’s rules, but called for the application of
French law and made Paris the venue for hearings. In addition,
the consortial agreement provided that if TKS and FLI ended up
in arbitration, FLI had the right to “join [CT] into the arbitration
proceedings with [TKS]….”
In 2011, General Electric purchased CT for $3.2 billion. As a result,
CT’s name was changed to GE Energy Power Conversion France
SAS, Corp. (GE Energy). In 2012, TKAG sold TKS, along with the
stainless steel portion of the Calvert factory, to Outokumpu Oyj
(OO), a Finnish company, for $3.6 billion. As a result, TKS, which
had been renamed Inoxum prior to the sale, became Outokumpu
Stainless USA, LLC (OS). In 2013, TKAG sold the carbon steel
portion of the Calvert factory to Luxembourg’s ArcelorMittal S.A.
and Japan’s Nippon Steel Corporation for $1.6 billion. In 2014, FLI
changed its name to Fives St. Corp.
In 2011, CT/GE Energy began delivering the motors to the Calvert
factory; by 2012, all nine had been installed. In June 2014, the
motors began to experience problems; by August 2015, all nine had
failed. As a result, OS suffered $45 million in damages.
On June 10, 2016, OS, its insurer (Sompo Japan Insurance
Company of America), and OO’s seven insurers (AIG Europe
Limited, AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance SA UK Branch, HDI
Gerling UK Branch, MSI Corporate Capital Ltd., Pohjola Insurance
Limited, Royal & Sun Alliance PLC, and Tapiola General Mutual
Insurance Company) sued GE Energy in the Mobile County Circuit
Court. On July 18, 2016, GE Energy, relying on both the New York
Convention (9 U.S.C. Section 205) and diversity jurisdiction
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(28 U.S.C. § 1332), removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Once in federal court, GE Energy, citing the TKS-FLI contract,
moved to compel arbitration in Germany and dismiss OS’s lawsuit.
On August 17, 2016, OS and the insurers objected to GE Energy’s
motion and moved to have the case remanded to state court.
On November 22, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge William
E. Cassady recommended that OS and the insurers’ motion
to remand be denied. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v.
Converteam SAS, 2016 WL 7423406 (S.D. Ala. 2016). Judge Cassady
made no recommendation as to GE Energy’s motion: “What is not
before the undersigned for decision, and a matter about which the
undersigned offers no opinion, is GE Energy’s motion to compel
arbitration and dismiss.”
On December 22, 2016, United States District Judge Kristi K.
DuBose adopted Judge Cassady’s recommendation to keep the
case in federal court. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v.
Converteam SAS, 2016 WL 7422675 (S.D. Ala. 2016).
On January 30, 2017, Judge DuBose granted GE Energy’s motion
to compel OS and its insurer to arbitrate in Germany and dismiss
their lawsuit. See Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam
SAS, 2017 WL 401951 (S.D. Ala. 2017). On February 3, 2017, Judge
DuBose similarly granted GE Energy’s motion to compel OO’s
insurers to arbitrate in Germany and dismiss their lawsuit. See
Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC v. Converteam SAS, 2017 WL 480716
(S.D. Ala. 2017). On March 1, 2017, GE Energy appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
On August 30, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion authored
by United States District Judge Beth F. Bloom, sitting by
designation, and joined in by United States Circuit Judges Julie
E. Carnes and Gerald B. Tjoflat, partially affirmed and partially
reversed. See Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS,
902 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2018).
Although the panel agreed with Judge DuBose’s decision to deny
OS and the insurers’ motion to remand, it disagreed with her
decision to grant GE Energy’s motion to compel arbitration in
Germany and dismiss OS and the insurers’ lawsuit. On November
9, 2018, in an unpublished order, the Eleventh Circuit denied
GE Energy’s motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. On
February 7, 2019, GE Energy filed a petition for certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, on December 7, 2018, OS and the insurers submitted
a new motion to remand. On March 19, 2019, Judge Cassady
recommended that it be granted due to the Eleventh Circuit’s
conclusion that the New York Convention was inapposite. See
Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. GE Energy SAS, 2019 WL
2158872, (S.D. Ala. 2019) (“The remaining state-law claims are
supplemental in nature, and the Court has inherent authority to
remand them to [the] state court…which will decide the merits
of the case.”). On April 18, 2019, now Chief Judge DuBose adopted
Judge Cassady’s recommendation. See Outokumpu Stainless USA,
LLC v. Converteam SAS, 2019 WL 1748110 (S.D. Ala. 2019).
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On May 17, 2019, GE Energy appealed Chief Judge DuBose’s
decision to the Eleventh Circuit. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme
Court granted GE Energy’s petition for certiorari. See GE Energy
Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 2776 (2019).
In an unpublished order dated August 1, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit
refused GE Energy’s request to stay its proceedings “pending
resolution of GE Energy’s appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court.”
As a result, briefing on the motion to remand was completed in
the Eleventh Circuit on November 7, 2019, while briefing on the
motion to compel arbitration was completed in the Supreme Court
on November 22, 2019.

CASE ANALYSIS
Ordinarily, an arbitration agreement is enforceable only against
the parties that have signed it. See United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). However, in
certain instances a non-party either can compel arbitration or be
compelled to arbitrate. This is because, as the Court explained in
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009):
Neither [§ 2 nor § 3 of Title 1] purports to alter
background principles of state contract law regarding
the scope of agreements (including the question of
who is bound by them). Indeed § 2 explicitly retains an
external body of law governing revocation (such grounds
“as exist at law or in equity”). And we think § 3 adds no
substantive restriction to § 2’s enforceability mandate.
“[S]tate law,” therefore, is applicable to determine which
contracts are binding under § 2 and enforceable under
§ 3…. Because “traditional principles” of state law allow
a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the
contract through “assumption, piercing the corporate
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party
beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel,” 21 R. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed.2001), the
Sixth Circuit’s holding that nonparties to a contract are
categorically barred from § 3 relief was error.
Id. at 630–31. Thus, if the relevant state law allows it, an
arbitration agreement can be used by, or applied against, a
non-party.
Carlisle was a Chapter 1 case, and the Supreme Court has not
said whether “background contract principles” can be used in a
Chapter 2 case. In her opinion finding that GE Energy could use
equitable estoppel—which prevents one party from taking unfair
advantage of another party—to compel OS and the insurers to
arbitrate in Germany, Judge DuBose assumed that background
contract principles can be imported into a Chapter 2 case because
of Chapter 2’s RAC:
[I]n order for [GE Energy] to be excluded from “Seller”
or “Party” when referring to “Seller,” or “Parties”
when referring to both “Seller” and “Buyer,” the Supply
Agreement must “expressly state[ ] otherwise.” (Id.)
Viewing the Supply Agreements as a whole and
construing any ambiguities against [TKS] as the drafter,
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

the Court finds that the plain language of the arbitration
provisions[] supports a reasonable interpretation that
subcontractors are not expressly excluded from the
meaning of “parties” in the arbitration provisions. There
is simply no express statement, as required by the Supply
Agreements, whereby the subcontractors are excluded as
“Seller” or “parties.”
2017 WL 401951, at *4 (footnotes omitted).
In disagreeing with Judge DuBose’s conclusion, Judge Bloom wrote:
The district court determined that GE Energy and [OS]
were parties to the Contracts by tracing the definitions
of “Buyer” and “Seller,” which included subcontractors
unless explicitly stated otherwise, and the definition
of “parties” as “Buyer” and “Seller.” Inserting these
definitions into the arbitration clause, the district court
found that there was an agreement in writing under the
meaning of the Convention which required [OS] and GE
Energy to arbitrate.
However, GE Energy is undeniably not a signatory to
the Contracts. At the time the Contracts were signed
by [TKS] and [FLI], GE Energy was a stranger to the
Contracts and, at most, a potential subcontractor. Private
parties—here [TKS] and [FLI]—cannot contract around
the Convention’s requirement that the parties actually
sign an agreement to arbitrate their disputes in order
to compel arbitration. New York Convention, Article II,
¶ 1; see also Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358
F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding sample wording, not
signed by the parties, did not satisfy the “agreement
in writing” requirement); Yang [v. Majestic Blue
Fisheries, LLC, 876 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2017)] (finding
“agreement in writing” requirement not satisfied to
compel arbitration between a non-signatory company and
signatory employee). Accordingly, we hold that, to compel
arbitration, the Convention requires that the arbitration
agreement be signed by the parties before the Court or
their privities….
Although parties can compel arbitration through
estoppel under Chapter 1 of the FAA, estoppel is only
available under Chapter 1 because Chapter 1 does not
expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to
an agreement. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556
U.S. 624, 630–31, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902, 173 L.Ed.2d
832 (2009). But the Convention imposes precisely
such a restriction. New York Convention, Article II, ¶ 2
(requiring that an “agreement in writing” be “signed
by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams”). Thus, GE Energy cannot compel [OS] to
arbitrate through estoppel. For this same reason, GE
Energy also cannot compel arbitration through a thirdparty beneficiary theory because, again, the Convention
requires that the agreement to arbitrate be signed by the
parties (or exchanged in letters or telegrams).
902 F.3d at 1326–27 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
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As is obvious, Judges DuBose and Bloom read Article II of the New
York Convention quite differently. In relevant part, it states:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement
in writing under which the parties undertake to submit
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen
or which may arise between them in respect of a
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.
2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an
arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement,
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of
letters or telegrams.
As noted by Judge Bloom, the Ninth Circuit (in Yang) also reads
Article II to preclude importing Chapter 1’s background contract
principles into a Chapter 2 case. Two other circuits, however, have
reached the opposite conclusion.
In Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco International, Inc., 526
F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008), the First Circuit wrote: “The fact that the
defendants are not signatories is not a basis on which arbitration
may be denied.”
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has twice held that an arbitration
clause can apply to a non-party in a Chapter 2 case. In
International Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen
GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000), a case with facts remarkably
like those in the OS-GE Energy dispute, the court explained:
International Paper is estopped from refusing to
arbitrate its dispute with Schwabedissen. The Wood–
Schwabedissen contract provides part of the factual
foundation for every claim asserted by International
Paper against Schwabedissen. In its amended complaint,
International Paper alleges that Schwabedissen failed
to honor the warranties in the Wood–Schwabedissen
contract, and it seeks damages, revocation, and rejection
“in accordance with” that contract. International
Paper’s entire case hinges on its asserted rights under
the Wood–Schwabedissen contract; it cannot seek to
enforce those contractual rights and avoid the contract’s
requirement that “any dispute arising out of” the
contract be arbitrated. The district court did not err in so
holding.
Id. at 418.
More recently, in Aggarao v. MOL Ship Management Co., 675 F.3d
355 (4th Cir. 2012), the Fourth Circuit decided that using equitable
estoppel in a Chapter 2 case is appropriate where the claims
against both the defendant that signed the arbitration agreement
and the defendant that did not are “based on the same facts,”
are “inherently inseparable,” and “fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause.”

SIGNIFICANCE
On its face, Article II is quite clear: only the actual parties to
an arbitration agreement are bound by it and entitled to take
advantage of it. Thus, if the Supreme Court decides to read the
Convention literally, OS and the insurers should prevail.
On the other hand, if the Court takes a more liberal view of
Article II’s language, then it should have no trouble finding for
GE Energy. In its amicus brief, the United States believes this is
the correct approach, especially given how other countries are
interpreting Article II:
For example, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland
recently rejected the argument that Article II of the
Convention prohibits a nonsignatory from enforcing an
arbitration agreement. See Bundesgericht [BGer], Case
No. 4A_646/2018 (Apr. 17, 2019), ¶ 2.4….
Courts in other Contracting States likewise have
concluded that the Convention’s form provisions in
Article II do not bar application of domestic-law doctrines
that govern when a nonsignatory may invoke or be
bound by an arbitration agreement. See, for example,
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice],
Case No. III ZR 371/12 (May 8, 2014)…(decision by the
German Federal Court of Justice concluding that the
form provisions in Article II would not prevent applying
an arbitration clause to a nonsignatory under domestic
law doctrines); Phillippe Pinsole, A French View on
the Application of the Arbitration Agreement to Nonsignatories, in The Evolution and Future of International
Arbitration (Stavros Brekoulakis et al. eds., 2016) ¶
12.33, at 214 (providing English translation of Paris
Court of appeal cases)….
Id. at 26–28.
In their joint reply brief, OS and the insurers dispute that foreign
countries (particularly Germany) recognize equitable estoppel,
which they describe as a “unique” U.S. doctrine.
Other amici supporting GE Energy take a different tack. In
their view, a decision to read the Convention strictly will make
international arbitration less attractive. For example, the Miami
International Arbitration Society predicts this will occur because
[i]nternational transactions often involve multiple
parties, subsidiaries, and subcontractors, each with their
own contracts and agreements. It would be impossible for
parties to extend arbitration agreements to include every
potential party as a signatory. The Eleventh Circuit’s
decision suppresses efficient international contracting by
imposing such a requirement on agreements subject to
the Convention. Should this Court affirm, international
arbitration would lose favor as a viable dispute resolution
mechanism.
Id. at 21.
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In their joint reply brief, OS and the insurers argue that the exact
opposite is true: “[B]y expanding a party’s arbitration obligations
beyond the scope of the consent expressed in its written
arbitration agreement, GE France’s position would undermine
incentives to enter such agreements in the first place.” Id. at 49.
As amicus supporting OS and the insurers, the Public Citizen
Litigation Group, a consumer advocacy organization, makes the
same point:
Invocation of federal policy supporting arbitration
of international disputes cannot justify expanding
the Convention’s scope beyond what its terms allow.
Federal policy favors arbitration only where parties
have consented to it. Adhering to the plain terms of
the Convention comports with that policy. By contrast,
importing expansive notions of equitable estoppel
into the Convention threatens to force international
businesses, as well as American workers and consumers,
to resolve grievances before foreign tribunals in the
absence of their consent to do so.
Id. at 2–3.
Public Justice, P.C., a national public interest law firm supporting
neither OS and the insurers nor GE Energy, has urged the Court to
focus on what it sees as a more pressing issue:
But the question of whether Chapters 1 and 2 of the
FAA provide the same rights to nonsignatories sidesteps
an even more fundamental question: what is meant by
the “doctrine of equitable estoppel”? That foundational
question should not linger in the shadows of this
Court’s opinion in this case; the Court should address it
directly.…
Traditionally, equitable estoppel was a defense that
prevented one party from taking unfair advantage of
another by making false representations on which
the other party detrimentally relied…. Yet [in]
arbitration [cases, U.S. courts now] require neither
detrimental reliance by the nonsignatory seeking
estoppel nor a misrepresentation by the plaintiff that
the nonsignatory seeks to estop…. Thus the continued
use of these doctrines, both in state and federal courts,
is inconsistent with Chapter 1 of the FAA…[and t]his
Court should say so expressly now, before the confusion
in the law grows any deeper.
Id. at 2–4.
Despite their erudition, the parties and amici all ignore (perhaps
purposefully) the two questions they should be asking: why is GE
Energy, the subsidiary of a United States company, so eager to
arbitrate in Germany? Alternatively, why is OS, the subsidiary of
a Finnish company, so eager to litigate in the United States? The
answer to both questions, of course, is that an Alabama jury is
likely to award much greater damages than a German arbitration
panel.
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Thus, at the end of the day, what this case really is about is
international forum shopping, a subject the Court knows well
and a strategy it repeatedly has refused to countenance. See, for
example, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. 528 (1995) (rejecting attempt to avoid arbitration in Japan);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (same); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(rejecting attempt to avoid arbitration in France); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (rejecting attempt to avoid
litigation in England).
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